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COMMENTS

COMMENTS
FEDERAL COURTS-APPEALS-FEDERAL RULE

54(b)

AND THE

FINAL JUDGMENT RuLE-

A._The Final Judgment Rule
The Judicial Code provides that "the circuit courts of appeal
shall have appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal final decisions •..
in the district courts, in all cases save where a direct review may be
had to the Supreme Court...." 1 But what is a final ( that is, appealable)
decision? The final judgment rule, originated by the English common
law courts 2 and embodied in the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,2 was
stated by Justice Brandeis in Collins v. Miller 4 to require "that the
judgment to be appealable should be final not only as to all the parties,
but as to the whole subject matter and as to all the causes of action
involved." 5
Application of this rule to every case has not been satisfactory, or
so it would seem from the number of exceptions that ha..ve been made.
There are express statutory exceptions when the district court makes
certain interlocutory orders or decrees concerning an injunction,° a receivership,7 or matters of admiralty.8 There are also judicial exceptions
to the rule, such as those mentioned by Judge Frank in Clark v. Taylor 9 :
" (I) An order dismissing a claim of a creditor in a receivership, although
the claims of the other creditors remained undetermined. ( 2) An order
that one party to an interpleader has no right against another, with the
rights of other parties still undecided. (3) An order denying title of
1

Judicial Code,§ 128 a, 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1947) § 225 (a).
Crick, "The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal," 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932).
8 l Stat. L. 85 ("final judgments and decrees").
4
252 U.S. 364, 40 S.Ct. 347 (1920).
5
Id. at 370.
6
''Where, upon a hearing in a district court, or by a judge thereof, in vacation,
an injunction is granted, continued, modified, refused, or dissolved by an interlocutory
order or decree, or an application to dissolve or modify an injunction is refused, or an
interlocutory order or decree is made appointing a receiver, or refusing an order to
wind up a pending receivership or to take the appropriate steps to accomplish the purposes
thereof, such as directing a sale or other disposal of property held thereunder, an appeal
may be taken from such interlocutory order or decree to the circuit court of appeals••••
The appeal ••. must be applied for within thirty days from the entry of such order or
decree .•••" Judicial Code,§ 129, 28 U.S.C. (1946) § 227.
7
Ibid.
8
"In all cases where an appeal from a final decree in admiralty to the circuit court
of appeals is allowed an appeal may also be taken to said court from an interlocutory decree
in admiralty determining the rights and liabilities of the parties...• Provided, That
the same is taken within fifteen days after the entry of the decree ...•" Judicial Code,
§ 129, 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1947) § 227.
9
(C.C.A. 2d, 1947) 163 F. (2d) 940.
2
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but one of several claimants in a condemnation proceeding. ( 4) An order
dismissing claims of only some of the plaintiffs in a trust accounting
action, where the divers plaintiffs' claims were not joint. (5) An order
denying intervention when it is a matter of right." 10

B. The Original Federal Rule 5 4 ( b)
The original Rule 54 (b) 11 provided that, when more than one
claim for relief was presented in an action, the district court, "upon a
determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence" which was "the subject
matter of the claim," might enter a judgment "di~posing of such claim."
Although it was for the circuit court of appeals to decide whether the
judgment was final so as to give it appellate jurisdiction,12 yet the rule
was apparently an attempt to redefine the established meaning of a final
decision, as that phrase is used in the jurisdictional statute.13 No longer
was a final decision one that completely determined the case and settled
all the claims. It was, rather, a decision which settled all the claims
arising out of one transaction or occurrence, even though other claims
were still pending in the same action. Was it possible for a rule, intended
to deal with procedure, to change the interpretation of a jurisdictional
statute? The issue seems to have been ignored by the courts, despite
assertions that the Federal Rules "do not affect the jurisdiction of the
appellate courts to which they are not directed." 14
.
I. The unit of appeal. The courts seem to have saved their energies
to wrestle with the problem of determining the part of an action which
the rule purported to make appealable. As one decision followed another,
the problem became more, rather than less, complicated. Perhaps a brief
summary of the divergent attacks upon the_problem will indicate why
a revision of Rule 54 (b) was a practical necessity.
a. Appealability of wholly unrelated claims. When there were
several wholly unrelated claims in an action, a complete disposition of
any one of these was appealable. 15 That much was clear.
Id. at 947.
28 U.S.C.A. (1941) foll. § 723 c.
12
"Even when the parties have not raised the issue, it is the duty of the court to
determine whether a 'decision' is 'final' under Judicial Code,§ 128, 28 U.S.C.A. § 225 •
• • . This is a matter for the appellate court to decide, whatever may have been the view
of the trial court." Audi Vision, Inc. v. R.C.A. Mfg. Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1943) 136 F.
(2d) 621 at 623.
18
See note 1, supra.
14
Hunteman v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., (C.C.A. 5th, 1941) II9 F.
(2d) 465 at 466. Also see Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., (C.C.A. 2d, 1939)
106 F. (2d) 83 at 85; 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE,§ 54.02 (1938).
15
Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U.S. 283, 62 S.Ct. 1085 (1942).
10
11
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b. Claims arising in part out of the same transaction or occurrence.
Although the Supreme Court gave its sanction 16 to the view that it was
"differing occurrences or transactions" 11 that was the basis of the unit
of appeal, this vague language lent itself to widely varying tests of appealability. If it is assumed that the occurrences or transactions did not
have to be wholly different, just how different did they have to be?
(I) Substantial additional evidence test of appealability. If "the
same evidence, without substantial additions" 18 would support both the
disposed of and undisposed of claims, the decision was not appealable;
but, if substantial additional evidence ·was needed, the decision was
appealable.19 This evidentiary approach is more easily stated than applied to the facts of a given case; and, even if the test could be applied,
there was no certainty that it might not be disregarded in favor of the
next test to be discussed. 20
(2) Central fact test of appealability. According to one view, claims
connected by a "central fact," 21 . could not be independently appealed.
But what was a central fact? In one case the court found the central fact
to be "the royalties collected by ASCAP for AKM and by AKM for
ASCAP and the legality and fact of offset between them"; 22 but, unfortunately, the court gave no very helpful clue that counsel might use to
recognize a central fact before its identity was revealed by the circuit
16

Ibid.
Id. at 28 5, citing with approval the concurring opinion of Clark, C.J., in
Atwater v. North American Coal Corp., (C.C.A. 2d, 1940) I I I F. (2d) 125 at 126.
18
Clark v. Taylor, (C.C.A. 2d, 1947) 163 F. (2d) 940 at 947.
19
The substantial additional evidence test was applied in Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp., (C.C.A. 2d, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 83 (order dismissing claim for infringement of a copyright book by a movie of the same name held appealable though a claim
for unfair competition in using the title of the book as the title of the movie was still
pending); but see the statement of Clark, C.J. that he withdrew his "somewhat qualified
support of that case with respect to its particular facts," though "the 'law' • . • was
impeccable," in Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., (C.C.A. 20., 1942) 127
F. (2d) 9 at 13, and note 2. Also see Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., (C.C.A. 2d, 1940)
113 F. (2d) 806 (order dismissing claims for violation of privacy in five states and
infringement of a civil rights statute in a sixth state held appealable though a claim of
malicious libel in nine other states was still pending); Musher Foundation, Inc. v.
Alba Trading Co., ibid. [ though a claim of trade mark ("Bertola") infringement was
still pending, order dismissing claim of unfair competition (as to use of word "infused")
held appealable]; Munson Line, Inc. v. Green, (C.C.A. 2d, 1948) 165 F. (2d) 321 at
322 (order dismissing two of three counts "to "be proved by substantially the same
evidence» held not appealable).
20
See Clark v. Taylor, (C.C.A. 2d, 1947) 163 F. (2d) 940, (both appellant and
appellee urged the substantial additional evidence test to justify the appeal but without
success).
·
21
CI~k v. Taylor, (C.C.A. 2d, 1947) 163 F. (2d) 940 at 947.
22
Clark v. Taylor, id. at 943. Cf. Crutcher v. Joyce, (C.C.A. 10th, 1943) 134 F.
(2d) 809.
17
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court of appeals. Since the central fact test discouraged interlocutory
appeals while the substantial additional evidence test was considerably
more favorable to them, it is not inconceivable that a circuit judge might
adopt the test which was the more in keeping with his philosophy as to
the desirability of interlocutory appeals; and the resulting uncertainty
as to which test would be applied in a given case was good reason for a
simplification of the original Rule 54 (b).
(3) Separate action test. One case suggested that claims could be
appealed separately if they "could be litigated together only because of
the permissible joinder provisions" 23 of the Federal Rules. '
(4) Analogical tests of appealability. Because the same concept of
transaction or occurrence was basic to both the appealability of a judgment
and the compulsory nature of a counterclaim, a judgment disposing of
a permissive counterclaim was held appealable, even though a compulsory counterclaim was still pending; 24 a judgment disposing of the main
claim was held not appealable while a compulsory counterclaim was still
pending; 25 and a judgment disposing of a compulsory counterclaim was
held not appealable while the main claim was pending.26
It was also suggested that, if a counterclaim would not be res judicata
if omitted, such a counterclaim was permissive and therefore independently appealable. 2 '
Also, the dismissal of a non-federal claim of unfair competition
which was not sufficiently related to the federal claim of patent infringement to support federal jurisdiction was held appealable. 28
Finally, it should be pointed out that the concept of joint liability
was sometimes useful in determining whether a decision was appealable,
for a "judgment or order dismissing an action as to less than all of several
defendants jointly charged" was not appealable. 20 ·
23

California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of California, Inc., (C.C.A. 2d, 1947)
162 F. (2d) 893 at 902.
24
Audi Vision, Inc. v. R.C.A. Mfg. Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 621.
25 Ibid.
26
Toomey v. Toomey, (App. D.C. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 19; Libbey-OwensFord Glass Co. v. Sylvania Industrial Corp., (C.C.A. 2d, 1946) 154 F. (2d) 814;
Nachtman v. Crucible Steel Co. of America, (C.C.A. 3d, 1948) 165 F. (2d) 997.
27
Frank, C.J., dissenting in Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. Sylvania Industrial Corp.,
(C.C.A. 2d, 1946) 154F. (2d) 814at 817.
28
Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 127 F.
(2d) 9. Also see Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., (C.C.A. 2d, 1939) 106 F.
(2d) 83.
29
Atwater v. North American Coal Corp., (C.C.A. 2d, 1940) III F. (2d) 125
at 125; Hunteman v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., (C.C.A. 5th, 1941) II9 F.
(2d) 465; Western Contracting Corp. v. National Surety Corp., (C.C.A. 4th, 1947)
163 F. (2d) 456 (principal and surety). Also see 47 CoL. L. REV. 239 at 248 (1947)
for discussion of confusion of the word, "joint." Cf. Studer v. Moore, (C.C.A. 2d,
1946) 153 F. (2d) 902.
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c. Appealability of interlocutory orders with regard to one claim.
The original Rule 54 (b) did not refer to interlocutory orders with
regard to one claim, perhaps because the rule was not intended to deal
with them. Whether such an order was appealable was to be determined,
not under Rule 54 (b), but under the statute 30 giving the circuit courts
of appeals jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions. Kasishke 'V.
Baker 31 involved an action to compel defendants to convey to plaintiff
a one-tenth interest in certain oil and gas leases and for an accounting of
profits from a joint venture involving the same leases. A judgment
which directed the defendants to make proper conveyances within a
specified time was held appealable by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
although the court retained the matter of the accounting for later action.
The court made no mention of Rule 54 (b) but decided, in the light of
precedent, that the judgment was a final decision. The court then concluded, "Why not determine that question [ whether plaintiff is an owner
of a ro per cent interest in the leases] now, and avoid any uncertainty
as to the right to an accounting, which the parties all admit will be
expensive and require much time? Practical considerations in the administration of justice suggest the necessity of treating the judgment as
final." 82 In Biggins 'V. Oltmer Iron Works 83 an erroneous partial summary judgment upon which execution had been ordered was held appealable by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals notwithstanding the
argument that Rule 54 (b) stood in the way. If an appeal were not
allowed, the judgment would be "subject to review only upon the entry
of a judgment disposing of the entire claim. In the meantime, the property of defendant could be seized and sold in satisfaction," so that defendant's "right of review ... would be of doubtful value." 84 Thus, it
would seem that the original Rule 54 (b) did not cover those situations
in which an interlocutory order with regard to one claim was held an
appealable final decision under the jurisdictional statute. This construction of the rule avoids possible conflict between the rule-making power
and that statute.
2. Running of appeal period. One of the chief difficulties under the
original Rule 54 (b) was that an attorney was never quite sure whether
a decision which did not dispose of the entire case was final and appealable. Therefore, to protect against the barring of the right of appeal by
lapse of time, the only safe course for the party adversely affected by a
decision was to appeal. One law review writer suggested that the appeal
period might be considered to run from the time of the final disposition
80
81

See note

1, supra.

(C.C.A. 10th, 1944) 144 F. (2d) 384.
82
Id. 386.
88
(C.C.A. 7th, 1946) 154 F. (2d) 214.
84
Id. at 217, 218.
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of the entire case in the district court, even as to a decision which could
have been, but was not, appealed before such final disposition.35 No court
gave any sanction to that view, but Judge Frank recommended it as a
proper subject of statutory enactment.36 What little authority there was
seemed to indicate that the time for appeal ran from the time of the
appealable decision, even though all of the issues in the case were not
adjudicated.37
C. The Revised Rule s 4 ( b)
The second attempt to alter the final judgment rule consisted of
taking the offending language ( that is, "transaction or occurrence") out
of Rule 54 (b) and giving the district court the discretion to decide what
claim or claims should be independently appealable.38
Although a claim was the smallest appeal unit mentioned in the
original Rule 54 (b ), two circuit courts of appeals allowed appeals in
hardship cases from interlocutory orders with regard to one claim.39 A
like result should be reached under the revised rule, because it, too, does
not purport to deal with appeals from such orders.40 The appealability
35

49 YALE L.J. 1476 at 1482 (1940).
Clarkv. Taylor, (C.C.A. 2d, 1947) 163 F. (2d) 940 at 952, note.
37
In Kasishke v. Baker, (C.C.A. 10th, 1944) 144 F. (2d) 384, discussed supra,
the court said at p. 386, "The defendants must either appeal or be met later with the
contention that having failed to appeal they are precluded from questioning the plaintiff's
ownership of a ten per cent interest in the leases." In Jefferson Electric Co. v. Sola
Electric Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 124, although the main action remained
to be tried, an order involuntarily dismissing a counterclaim involving closely related
matters was held appealable because it was an adjudication on the merits under Rule 41
-no express mention being made of Rule 54 (b) ; and the court stated that such an order
was appealable, if at all, within the statutory three months for appeals from final orders.
But see- Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Sylvania lndust. Corp., (C.C.A. 2d, 1946)
154 F. (2d) 814 at 817, where it is said of the Jefferson case, "The court appears
to have been mjslead by the effect of Federal Rule 41 (b,c) making such a dismissal an
adjudication upon the merits. It did not cite the more pertinent and decisive rule,
54 (b)."
38
The Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp.
1948) foll.§ 723 c, adopted_by the Supreme Court on Dec. 27, 1946, 329 U.S. 839
(1946), and since become effective, together with Notes of the Advisory Committee, are.
conveniently set forth in IO Fed. Rules Serv. xci, comparing the terms of the revised
rules with the terms of the original rules. For other comments on Rule 54 (b) see
47 Cot. L. REv. 239 (1947) and 56 YALE L.J. 141 (1946).
39
See Kasishke v. Baker, (C.C.A. 10th, 1944) 144 F. (2d) 384, and Biggins v.
Oltmer Iron Works, (C.C.A. 7th, 1946) 154 F. (2d) 214, discussed supra.
40
The revised rule provides that, when the district judge does not appropriately
mark a decision final, "any order or other form of decision, however designated, which
adjudicates less than all the claims shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims...•" Arguably, an interlocutory order with regard to one claim is a decision
"which adjudicates less than all the claims" and therefore falls within the letter of the
rule. However, the rule merely states that a decision which is not marked final and
"which adjudicates less than all the claims shall not terminate the action as to any of the
36
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of interlocutory orders is entirely controlled by the final decision statute 41 as interpreted by the courts.
The real problem as to the revised rule is the possible conflict with
the statute giving the circuit courts of appeals appellate jurisdiction.
The rule restates the final judgment rule 42 as follows: "Any order or
other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than
all the claims shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims ...."
However, the rule qualifies this position by stating that, when more than
one claim is presented in an action, "the court may direct the entry of a
final judgment upon one or more but less than all of the claims ...
upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and
upon an express direction for the entry of judgment." Arguably, this.is
an invalid attempt to use the rule-making power to alter the meaning
of the phrase, final decision, in the jurisdictional statute. That phrase
has been interpreted by the courts to embody the final judgment rule
"that the judgment to be appealable should be final ... as to all the
parties, ... as to the whole subject-matter and as to all the causes of
action involved"; 43 but now Rule 54 (b) changes this construction by
providing that a judgment as to a claim may be made appealable even
though the whole action has not been disposed of.
However, it is possible to read the revised Rule 54 (b) and the
jurisdictional statute together in such a way that there is little conflict
between them. The district judge may be said to have power, not only
to consolidate actions for hearing and trial 44 and to order a separate trial
on any claim in a single action,45 but also to separate into distinct actions
for purposes of judgment claims which are brought as, or consolidated
into, one action but which could have been separately brought and tried.
The district judge does not have discretion to make a decision upon one
branch of an action final; he has discretion only to separate one complex
claims • ••" (italics supplied). The rule does not cover the situation where an interlocutory order with regard to one claim which does not purport to terminate the action is an
appealable final decision under Judicial Code, § 128 a, 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1947)
§ 225 (a), as interpreted, or under exceptions thereto quoted in notes 6 and 8, supra.
Because the rule states that a decision which is not marked final and which does not
adjudicate all the claims does not terminate the action as to any of the claims, it does not
follow that the rule means that a decision which is not marked final and which does not
adjudicate all the claims cannot be appealable under the jurisdictional statute.
41
See note 1, supra.
.
42
There are really two branches of the final judgment rule: that interlocutory
orders with regard to one claim arc not appcalablc and that all claims in an action must
be adjudicated before any are appealable; and there are exceptions to both branches of
the rule. If the analysis set forth in note 40, supra, is correct, then the revised Rule
54 (b) deals only with the second branch of the rule.
48
Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364 at 370, 40 S.Ct. 347 (1920).
44
Federal Rule 42 (a).
45
Federal Rule 42 (b).
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action into several actions for purposes of judgment. Such a power deals
with procedure, so there is no conflict with the jurisdictional statute,
because, since the action has been separated into several actions for
purposes of judgment, the judgment upon each branch of the original
action can become a final decision within the meaning of the final judgment rule. This interpretation of Rule 54 (b) has the advantage of
being relatively easy to apply, for there is no great problem as to the
nature of the unit of appeal, a claim, though the same could not be said
about the nature of a transaction or occurrence.
However, as a matter of policy, is it wise to give the district judge
the discretion to separate an action for purposes of judgment? Although
the trial judge may not appreciate the value of an appeal from what he
considers a fair decision, 46 yet he is the person most conveniently situated
to determine whether an immediate appeal is necessary. 47
A distinct advantage of the revised rule is that it should eliminate the
uncertainty as to when the appeal period begins to run. When one action
is separated into several for purposes of judgment and there is a decision
completely disposing of one of the newly created separate actions, there
clearly seems to be a final judgment upon which the appeal period
begins to run at once. But what of dispositions of claims or interlocutory
orders as to one claim which statutes or judicial decisions have made
appealable though the action is not fully adjudicated? Though not
marked final, do such appealable decisions start the appeal period run, ning? As to the express statutory provisions for interlocutory appeal,48
there is no difficulty in determining when the appeal period begins to
run, for the situations in which appeal will lie are clearly stated and the
appeal period is expressly stated to run from the entry of the order. But
the problem as to those more or less uncertain judicial exceptions to the
final judgment rule which permit appeals from order~ as to one claim
which are interlocutory in nature but treated as final decisions remains
unaffected by the rule.49 And the problem as to those more or less uncertain judicial exceptions to the final judgment rule which permit appeals
from decisions of claims before the whole action is disposed of presents,
perhaps, a trap for the unwary. Relying upon Rule 54 (b ), which in
terms covers this situation, counsel might not appeal, because the decision
is not marked final, only to find later that the time for appeal began to
run when the appealable decision was made.50
46
See the dissent of Frank, C.J., in Clark v. Taylor, (C.C.A. 2d, 1947) 163 F.
(2d) 940 at 942, note 2.
47
56 YALE L.J. 141 at 149 (1946).
48 See notes 6 and 8, supra.
49
See the second paragraph of part C, st1pra.
50
See Blackwood v. Shaffer, 44 Kan. 273 at 276, 24 P. 423 (1890), where the
court said, ''When a case is brought to the supreme court for the purpose of having any
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D. Proposed Changes in Jurisdictional Statute
Since the scope of the judicial exceptions to the final judgment rule
is not at all certain, thereby making it difficult in situations where Rule
54 (b) is not controlling to determine when an appeal will lie, it is
suggested that the statute giving appellate jurisdiction to the circuit
courts of appeals should be amended, first to define final decision as a
decision which adjudicates all the claims in a civil action or in a branch
of a civil action that has been severed for judgment and, second, to-list
all the specific situations in which interlocutory appeals might lie. Such
a list might include; (I) the situations in which interlocutory appeals
are already provided for by statute.51 Further, (2) a decision of any
preliminary question ( such as is raised by an objection to venue or jurisi::liction or an objection to the complaint as failing to state a claim for
relief), which question, if answered one way, would necessitate a trial,
while, if answered the other way, would make a trial unnecessary, should
be appealable so long as there is a showing that the appeal is made in
good faith and not as a mere device to delay the action. The circuit judges
could act individually in determining whether the appeal was made in
good faith and had such merit as to deserve consideration by a full court;
and, to prevent undue delay, the appeal should be given preference over
other matters and arguments kept as short as practicable. (3) If an action
has been disposed of, except for proof of the extent of the damages or
for an accounting, an interlocutory appeal should be allowed upon a
showing that proof of the extent of the damages or the accounting would
be time-consuming and costly.62 (4) A decree for the sale of particular
property should be appealable, even though such matters as the distribution of the proceeds remain undetermined. 53 (5) A decree directing
immediate payment of money and ordering execution should be appealable 5¾ unless the party adversely affected can obtain protection by means
of a bond.55 ( 6) An order authorizing the issuance of receiver's certificates, secured upon property in the court's custody, should be appealable,
when a reversal of the order, after the issuance and sale of the certificates,
judgment or order of the court below reviewed, everything necessarily involved in such
judgment or order is reviewable in the supreme court; but the order of the court below
in this case, sustaining the demurrer to the third paragraph of the defendant's answer
[ such an order being appealable under the Kansas statutes], is not involved in any other
order, or in any judgment of the court below, and hence it is not reviewable upon this
principle. If the demurrer had been overruled, a different rule would apply." The
court held that the time for appeal ran from the date of the appealable order sustaining
the demurrer rather than from the date of the judgment disposing of the rest of the case.
51
See notes 6 and 8, supra.
52
See discussion of the Kasishke case in part B I c, supra.
58
RosE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE, 4th ed., § 651 (1931).
5¾ Ibid.
55
Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Manos, (D.C. S.C. 1938) 25 F. Supp. 233.
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would not discharge the lien upon the property. 56 (7) There are other
types of decision which might well be proper subjects for interlocutory
appeal. The six situations mentioned by Judge Frank, as quoted at the
beginning of the comment, might be included in the list.
Such suggestions are put forth not as a definitive solution to the
perplexing problems discussed above but merely to propose further
means for securing "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action." 57
W. Stirling Maxwell: S.Ed.

- 56
57

See note 53, supra.
Federal Rule I.

